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Abstract
This work analyses the implications, in terms of determinacy and E-
stability of equilibrium, of a policy rule that responds to private sector
expectations in forward looking models. In the literature, this type of policy
has been both recommended and criticized. We try to understand the
reasons for such di¤erent conclusions and shed some light on the desirability
of this type of policy rules.
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1. Introduction
In the standard forward-looking New Keynesian model, as presented, e.g., in Clar-
ida, Gali and Gertler (1999), the optimal fundamentals-based policy rule generates
both indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibria and instability of learning
dynamics, as shown in Evans and Honkapohja (2003). In the same framework,
these authors show, a policy rule that responds also to private sector expectations
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is able to amend these shortcomings: the ensuing recommendation for policymak-
ers is to use this type of rules. On the contrary, previous works had argued against
the same type of policies. In particular, Bernanke and Woodford (1997) found
that conditioning the policy rule on private expectations increases the possibil-
ity of generating indeterminacy, and thus advised policymakers not to respond
to private expectations. The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the
reasons why such di¤erent results have been obtained, in order to understand
whether or not a policymaker should respond to private expectations. We nd
that the criticism put forward by Bernanke and Woodford (1997) doesnt sur-
vive to a more careful specication of what an expectations-based policy should
respond to, provided the policy parameters are optimally tuned.
2. New Keynesian models
2.1. With current expectations
The model used in Evans and Honkapohja (2003) (hereafter E&H) is the standard
forward-looking New Keynesian framework, as presented, e.g., in Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1999). The two relevant equations are:
yt =  ' (it   Ett+1) + Etyt+1 + gt (1)
t = yt + Ett+1 + ut: (2)
Equation (1) is a forward-looking IS equation and (2) an expectations-augmented
Phillips curve; yt is the output gap, it the interest rate, here taken to be the
policy instrument, and t is the ination rate. E indicates expectations. The two
exogenous shocks gt and ut follow AR(1) processes with damping coe¢ cients ;
 2 [0; 1).
2.2. With past expectation
The system used by Bernanke and Woodford (1997) (B&W) is described by the
following equations:
~yt = Et~yt+1    (it   Ett+1   t) (3)
t = Et 1t+1 + kEt 1(~yt   t); (4)
where ~yt represents real output. In this model it is assumed that any price change
chosen at time t takes place at time t + 1, and this is the reason for the di¤er-
ent timing of expectations in equation (4) compared to equation (2), where it
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is assumed that price changes take place in the same period they are decided.
Therefore in B&W ination at time t depends only on information available at
time t  1, when pricing decisions were taken. The two exogenous disturbances t
and t follow AR(1) processes with damping coe¢ cients ;  2 [0; 1):
2.3. Policy rule
2.3.1. Fundamentals-based policy rule
The policy problem is to minimize expected deviations of output gap and ina-
tion from their target levels over the innite future horizon. E&H show that an
optimal fundamental-based policy rule1 in their setting leads to indeterminacy
of equilibria, i.e., to multiple stable RE solutions; moreover, the minimum state
variable (MSV) solution is E-unstable, which implies that it can not be learned
by agents through recursive least square (RLS) procedures.2 When we derive an
optimal discretionary fundamentals-based policy in the B&W framework, we nd
that the system is indeterminate and the fundamental equilibrium is E-unstable
for values of the autoregressive parameter  close to 1.
2.3.2. Expectations-based policy rule
To overcome the negative results outlined above, E&H propose an alternative pol-
icy that responds also to private sector expectations. The optimal expectations-
based discretionary policy they derive3 takes the form
it =

1 +

'(+ 2)

Ett+1 +
1
'
Etyt+1 +

'(+ 2)
ut +
1
'
gt: (5)
Equations (1), (2) and (5) represent the new system describing the evolution of
the economy given private sector expectations. E&H show that the MSV REE of
this model is both determinate and E-stable (see their Proposition 3). Note that
in equation (5) the Taylor principle is satised, since the nominal interest rate
responds more than proportionally to changes in ination expectations.4
1This is a policy rule that responds only to fundamentals of the economy, in particular here
to the two exogenous shocks.
2For the relation between E-stability and learnability, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
3Here we assume that the target values for both ination and output gap are zero.
4Note also that policy rule (5) complies with Proposition 4 in Bullard and Mitra (2002),
which indicates necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a policy rule to induce determinacy in
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But here is the puzzle: B&W showed that when a policy rule of the form
it = 
f
t+1 + y~yt, (6)
where ft+1 is the forecast of time t+ 1 ination announced by private forecasters
at time t, is used, the problem of indeterminacy found under the fundamentals-
based policy is likely to increase instead of decreasing. The ensuing advice for the
policymaker is not to condition its policy on private expectations.
The policymaker is assumed here to observe all the past history of ination
and output, up to time t, but not the value at time t of the fundamental shocks.
He thus responds to current output and private sector ination expectations, both
of which he can observe.
We extend now B&W analysis and study E-stability of the MSV solution in
their original setting, in order to compare results with E&H. Rewriting the system
in the standard form
xt = AEtxt+1 +Bvt; (7)
with
A =
 
 k
(1 )
1+y
1
1+y
!
; (8)
we nd the actual law of motion (ALM) for the economy and derive the map
from the perceived law of motion (PLM) of agents to the ALM, which governs the
E-stability properties of the system.5 It turns out that the eigenvalues govern-
ing E-stability are the eigenvalues of the A matrix (8) that govern determinacy,
multiplied by the two AR(1) coe¢ cients for the shocks. Therefore, if the system
is determinate, then the unique solution is also E-stable. If instead we are in
the indeterminacy region, E-stability depends on the value of the autoregressive
parameters  and . We nd that for some sensible parameter values of the struc-
tural and policy parameters, at least one eigenvalue lies outside the unit circle.
Therefore, both indeterminacy and E-instability may plague this economy.
this type of models.
5The complete analysis is available from the author upon request.
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3. Why such di¤erent results?
We want to understand here why such di¤erent conclusions were reached about
the opportunity to base a policy rule on private expectations.
Comparing the E&Hmodel with the B&Wone, both closed with an expectations-
based discretionary policy rule, we can see that equation (3) is qualitatively the
same as equation (1). Di¤erences come from the Phillips curve and the policy
rule. The Phillips curve (4) di¤ers from (2) for the timing of expectations: while
in equation (2) the relevant variables are current output gap and expected future
ination, in equation (4) current ination depends on past expectations of future
ination and on past expectations of current output gap.
Policy rule (6) di¤ers from policy rule (5) in a more substantial way: equation
(5) includes expectations of both output gap and ination, in addition to funda-
mental shocks. On the contrary, equation (6) responds only to ination forecasts,
and to current output. It does not respond to the exogenous shocks, which are not
supposed to be known to by policymaker. But if we look carefully, we can see that
a policy rule of the form (6) does not actually respond to private expectations. In
fact, when the system is put into the standard form (7), the Phillips curve (4) is
moved forward: this implies that the current variables are time t output and time
t + 1 ination, exactly those the policymaker responds to,6 while expected vari-
ables in the Phillips curve, Ett+2 and Et~yt+1, do not enter into the policy rule.
Therefore, the authority can not o¤set private expectations in an e¤ective way
and can not prevent them from introducing self-fullling elements in the system.
To better grasp the di¤erences in the two models and their impact on the
relevant equilibrium properties, we take progressive steps from the B&Ws towards
the E&Hs setting.
In moving from B&W to E&H the rst step is to change the timing in the
Phillips curve. We suppose that ination is no longer determined one period in
advance, but within the period, as in most models. Equation (4) becomes
t = Ett+1 + k(~yt   t): (9)
Using equation (3) and policy rule (6), and writing the system in the standard
6Since in the model it is assumed that prices are predetermined, that private agents have all
the relevant information at time t and that they make their forecasts by minimizing the variance
of their forecast error, it follows that ft+1 = Ett+1 = t+1:
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form, the A matrix governing determinacy is now
A =
 
 + k(1 )
1+y
k
1+y
(1 )
1+y
1
1+y
!
(10)
whose two eigenvalues depend, among other things, on the value of the policy
parameters, and at least one is found to lie outside the unit circle when  is
positive and greater than one and y is a negative small number.
By changing the timing in the Phillips curve, we have made ination a non-
predetermined variable: using a policy rule of the form (6), the policymaker is now
actually responding to expectation of a current endogenous variable. But he is not
responding yet to expectations of output, which are still free to oat and a¤ect
the outcome of the system. The authority is also not responding to fundamental
shocks, but this feature clearly doesnt a¤ect equilibrium determinacy and E-
stability, which only depend on the values of the entries in matrix A.
We make now the policymaker respond to expected future output instead of to
current output. The system, thus, is now the same as the one analyzed in E&H,
except that here the policy parameters are left general and are not derived through
optimality conditions.7 The new policy rule is (neglecting the terms pertaining to
the shocks, which we have just seen are irrelevant for determinacy and E-stability
analysis)
it = Ett+1 + yEt~yt+1 (11)
and matrix A becomes
A =

 + k(1  ) k(1  y)
(1  ) 1  y

; (12)
again, at least one of its eigenvalue is found to lie outside the unit circle for sensible
values of the policy coe¢ cients and structural parameters.
But if we derive the policy coe¢ cients through optimality conditions, then
both eigenvalues are constrained to lie inside the unit circle for any choice of the
parameter values, and therefore both determinacy and E-stability obtain.8 In
particular, an optimal policy is able to completely o¤set the e¤ect of expected
7Another di¤erence is, of course, that here output, as opposed to output gap, enters the
policy rule; but this doesnt a¤ect our argument.
8The two eigenvalues are 0 and =(k2 + ), with the second always less than one for the
restrictions on structural parameters: 0 <  < 1;  > 0; k > 0.
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future output on current output and on ination. Mathematically, this makes the
right column of the A matrix equal to zero, leading to a zero eigenvalue.9
We also nd that even in the original setting of B&W, as represented by equa-
tions (3) and (4), the expectations-based discretionary policy generates both deter-
minacy and E-stability when it is optimally tuned. But to obtain these results, the
policy rule must respond to the variables that make the system forward-looking;
thus, in B&W setting, to Et~yt+1 and Ett+2.
We want also to emphasize that if the central bank cannot respond to funda-
mental shocks, as assumed in B&W, it still can induce determinacy and E-stability
of equilibrium (which in this case will not be the one with fully stabilized ination
and output gap) by responding solely to expectations in the optimal discretionary
way. Stabilizing the economy w.r.t. exogenous fundamental shocks is a completely
di¤erent task from that of inducing a unique learnable equilibrium: while the rst
task requires a policy response to the shocks, the second calls for a response to
expectations.
The economic intuition behind the determinacy and E-stability results outlined
above goes as follows: a policy rule that responds optimally to private sector
expectations is able to o¤set their impact on current variables and can thus prevent
them from becoming self-fullling and generating a multiplicity of equilibria; in
addition, if expectations fail to be rational, the policy response guides them back
towards rationality, thus assuring E-stability.
4. Conclusions
We have shown that di¤erent results present in the literature about the desirability
of an expectations-based policy rule can be attributed to two reasons. First,
given the timing in their setting, the type of policy presented by Bernanke and
Woodford (1997) as one that targets private forecasts doesnt really respond to
private expectations but to current values of the endogenous variables. Secondly,
the policy parameters need to be optimally tuned in order to e¤ectively o¤set the
destabilizing inuence of expectations on current variables.
9The optimal value for y is
1
 , while that for  is 1 +
k
(+k2) :
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